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Abstract:  The observation that many workers report wanting to work more or fewer 
hours at their current rate of pay appears to contradict standard neoclassical theory. 
Although most jobs limit the ability of workers to choose hours, economists typically 
assume that  workers can choose hours by choosing  jobs. The puzzle is why workers 
have not chosen  jobs which allow them to work the number of hours they prefer. This 
paper outlines two classes of  reasons that  hours constraints might be observed in a 
neoclassical market equilibrium – mismatch (caused by search costs or market thinness) 
or wedges between imagined and feasible hours-compensation combinations  (caused by 
market power,  implicit contracts, overtime premia and fixed costs of employment like 
fringe benefits.) Using proxies for each of these putative explanations and cross-section 
data on self-reported hours constraints I find support for explanations that rely on fixed 
cost fringe benefits, overtime premia,  search costs and unions but no support for the 
monopsony power or market thinness explanations.  Moreover, the data are consistent 
with  two strong empirical implications of  hours constraints being illusory in the sense 




*I appreciate helpful comments and suggestions from  Leora Friedberg, Helen Levy, 
Derek Neal, Steve Stern,  Sarah Turner, Jim Ziliak, and workshop participants at the 
University of Virginia,  Princeton University, and the SOLE meetings in June, 2005.   The standard neoclassical theory of labor supply assumes that workers can choose 
their preferred hours of work at a constant rate of pay per hour either directly by choosing 
their hours within a job or indirectly by choosing a job.  In fact, the usual response to a 
student who notes that most jobs do not allow much choice of hours is to argue that even 
if jobs allow no choice of hours, workers can in effect choose their hours by choosing 
their job.  In this market equilibrium, every worker will be working as much as she wants 
even though not every job allows the worker to choose her hours. 
 However, about a third of all U.S. workers say they would like to work either 
more hours or fewer hours than they currently work at the same hourly rate of pay,  an 
observation of hours constraints that appears to be inconsistent with the neoclassical labor 
market described above.  I argue that  hours constraints can arise either because the 
preferred job is feasible but market frictions like search costs and market thinness have 
kept the worker from taking it or because the preferred job is economically infeasible.  A 
third possibility would be that preferred jobs are feasible but the labor market does not 
work well enough to match jobs to the preferences of workers, an indictment of the 
neoclassical model.  If the preferred jobs are infeasible, however,  hours constraints could 
be seen as illusory because a worker’s current job is actually the most preferred feasible  
pair of compensation and hours. Hours constraints would then not imply inefficiency.   
Under these two general sources of hours constraints,  I examine six distinct 
theoretical mechanisms,  each of which generates hypotheses that can be tested with data 
on the current job characteristics and the labor market characteristics of workers who 
report a desire to work more or work less at their current wage.  The two market friction 
or mismatch explanations are costly job search and the thinness of labor markets.  The   2
other four mechanisms make some choices of hours economically infeasible at the  
average hourly earnings he currently enjoys; that is, the set of feasible jobs is not a 
proportional expansion or contraction of his current hours and monetary compensation, 
creating a wedge between the worker’s perceived  return to an  hour of work  and the 
value of a marginal hour to the employer.  The four sources of these wedges  are the fixed 
cost of employing a worker such as fringe benefits whose cost does not depend on worker 
hours, market power (monopsony or union monopoly), mandated overtime premia, and 
implicit contracts.  These are all reasons that employers care about worker hours, 
implying that while jobs with any number of hours may be offered by employers, jobs 
with any number of hours and the same hourly rate of pay as the current job may not be 
available. In that sense, the wedges create the illusion of hours constraints;  workers can 
choose any job that is economically feasible but working more or fewer hours at the same 
hourly pay rate may not be feasible. 
Data on self-reported hours constraints comes from the May 2001 Current 
Population Survey (CPS), which asked workers if they would prefer to work less and 
earn less money, or work more and earn more money.  Workers who say they want to 
work less do work less on average when they change jobs, so their self-reports accord 
with their behavior.  Data from other months of the CPS and from geographic areas can 
be matched to that data to allow one to test these six hypotheses about the origin of hours 
constraints.  To summarize my results, there is strong evidence that fixed costs of 
employment such as fringe benefits cause hours constraints as theory predicts.  I find no 
evidence that either monopsony or labor market thinness is related to hours constraints. 
And there is some evidence that search costs are linked to a mismatch of actual and   3
desired hours and that unionized workers and workers subject to overtime premia want to 
work more.  Actual hours are also strongly related to hours constraints, as mismatch or 
implicit contract models predict.  Finally, two important implications of the illusion- 
wedge idea are confirmed in the data.  First, holding actual hours constant, workers 
facing a wedge caused by fringe benefits are more likely to report hours constraints. 
Second, among constrained workers only those facing fringe benefit wedges do not 
subsequently adjust their hours to mitigate the hours constraint, an observation that is 
consistent with the infeasibility of the  jobs these workers would prefer.        
One important aspect of the paper is that it is implicitly a test of the working of 
the labor market. On its face, evidence that many workers would like to work less or 
more than they now do suggests that the labor market does not assign worker to jobs 
efficiently, but under the wedge explanations, hours constraints do not imply inefficiency.   
  The study also has implications for the analysis of specific polices.  Government 
provision of fringe benefits (such as health insurance financed by taxation) or mandates 
for fringe benefits could alter the distribution of work hours and affect perceived hours 
constraints. Likewise these results suggest that unemployment insurance may improve 
matching in the labor market, at least in the sense of reducing discrepancies between 
desired and actual hours of work. 
 
 
I. Background  
Employers typically do not give workers much discretion to choose hours of 
work; instead, employers offer “jobs” which are tied packages of earnings, hours and   4
fringe benefits, which can either be accepted or rejected.  Of course, workers can choose 
among jobs and in that way choose hours, so the fact that some workers say they would 
like to work more or less is still a puzzle to explain.  Why don’t workers find jobs which 
match their preferences? 
  Kahn and Lang (1996) test a version of the wedge model (their “hedonic” 
model), noting that hours constraints arise when the marginal wage differs from the 
average wage.  Workers choose labor supply by equating the marginal value of leisure to 
the marginal wage.  If they could work any number of hours at the average wage of their 
current job, they would choose more hours if the average wage exceeds the marginal 
wage and would choose fewer hours if the average wage is less than the marginal wage. 
Kahn and Lang find that the pattern of reported hours constraints is consistent with the 
shape of the wage-hours locus they estimate at least under certain specifications, but, as 
they note,  it is difficult to identify a locus of wages and hours available to a single 
worker from  data on hours and earnings across workers.  They also do not examine the 
underlying causes of the wage-hours locus. 
For the most part, however, the existing empirical literature on hours constraints 
in labor supply focuses not on the causes of these constraints but on issues such as the 
effect of hours constraints on labor supply estimates (e.g., Kahn and Lang (1991)) and the 
extent to which hours are constrained (Dickens and Lundberg (1993) and Stewart and 
Swaffield (1997)).  Altonji and Paxson (1988, 1992) look at the implications of job 
changing when hours are constrained on the initial job.  Bloemen (2005) builds a model 
in which workers search along two dimensions, wages and required hours, but the 
distribution of jobs and their hours requirements is taken as exogenous in his model.     5
The literature has probed reasons that employers care about the hours their 
employees work, emphasizing non-linearities in either the return to an hour of labor or 
the cost of an hour of labor to the employer. For example, fixed costs of employment, set-
up costs and fatigue effects imply that an employer will not be indifferent about the hours 
his employee works, (Hamermesh (1993), p 44).  Cutler and Madrian (1998) point to 
evidence that rising health insurance costs have led to increased hours of work per worker 
as employers seek to cover increased fixed costs of employment. However, their 
empirical study does not directly observe evidence on hours constraints but only hours of 
work.   Similarly, legally mandated overtime wage premia also affect employers’ 
preferences over hours of work as employers try to avoid paying employees the overtime 
premium (See Ehrenberg (1971)).  
Manning (2003) has argued that constrained work hours are consistent with the 
exercise of monopsony power by employers.  The intuition is that in monopsony the 
wage rate is less than the value of marginal product, which means that if the firm can 
induce the worker to work more than she would voluntarily choose at the monopsony 
wage, it can make even more profit.  Hence, Manning argues, monopsonies will require 
more hours than workers will choose at the simple monopsony wage and workers will 
report wanting to work less at the wage they are offered.   However, no empirical study 
links the extent of monopsony power to the degree of hours constraints. 
  Finally, hours restrictions arise in models which are alternatives to continuously 
clearing spot labor markets.  Implicit contract theory, for example, breaks the link 
between the current wage and hours of work.   In risk-sharing implicit contract models, 
hours are determined efficiently by equating the value of marginal product with the   6
marginal opportunity cost of labor, but wages are determined by long-run risk-sharing 
criteria.  Hence, as the value of marginal product varies over the business cycle, the 
contract, which is efficient in the long run,  will require workers to work hours they 
would not choose  to work at the wage they are paid. (See Beaudry and di Nardo (1995) 
and Ham and Reilly (2002).) 
 
II. Hours Constraints in Market Equilibrium: Theory 
Hours constraints can stem from wedges or from mismatch.    Wedges arise when 
feasible  monetary compensation is not proportional to hours.
1  Causes of wedges are 1) 
fixed costs of employment or other non-convexities,  2) market power (whether 
monopsony or unions) which makes the hours-compensation menu an isoprofit or union 
rent locus,  3) implicit contracts which break the tie between the current wage and 
worker’s value of marginal product, and  4) legal constraints such as overtime laws which 
make it illegal for the firm to offer jobs with more than forty weekly hours at the same 
wage rate.   Mismatch implies that there is a feasible job that is preferred to the current 
job but the worker does not have it either because 5) the cost of search keeps the worker 
from finding the ideal job or because 6) market thinness implies that the job, though 
economically feasible, is not offered because the worker’s labor market is too small.  The 
first four theories operate at the level of the firm or worker and predict hours constraints 
in a particular direction; the last two causes are market level phenomena and predict 
mismatch of hours in no particular direction. 
                                                 
1 The term wedge is also used to describe the effect of taxes on labor income in creating a difference 
between the cost of an hour of labor to the employer and the return to an hour of labor to the worker. Tax 
wedges in competitive labor markets do not cause hours constraints because each agent, worker or 
employer, is small relative to the market and faces parametric marginal  labor costs  or returns to working.  
In contrast, here the marginal labor costs or returns are not parametric and depend on worker hours.     7
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to build one theoretical model that 
incorporates all six of these features and endogenizes both worker and employer 
behavior.  Instead the six conceptually distinct explanations are considered separately, 
although it should be understood that they likely coexist and interact.  For example, 
search costs will give employers monopsony power. Likewise, the interest employers 
have in packaging hours and compensation into jobs gives rise to search issues since now 
the worker must search among hours-compensation packages rather than search only for 
the highest wage and then choose hours.  
 
 
A. Wedge Theories 
 
Fixed Costs of Employment 
The first line of argument emphasizes convex production situations in which the 
marginal value of labor’s product to the firm exceeds its average value.  Examples would 
be set-up costs of either money or time, which must be incurred before the worker is 
productive.  One solution to this problem is for the firm to offer the worker a nonlinear 
pay function which exactly matched the production function.  For example, if the first 
hour of work each day is not productive at all, but each subsequent hour produces $10 of 
value, the firm could match that by offering a nonlinear pay function (0 dollars for one 
hour of work, 10 for two, 20 for three, etc) and then let workers decide how much to 
work.  The average hourly pay of these feasible jobs will vary over the number of hours 
worker, however, and legal minimum wages would further restrict the set of feasible jobs.   8
Another setup cost, which will be a focus of the empirical work because it is 
observable,  is the cost of fringe benefits that are independent of hours of work.  For 
example, if the employer pays for health insurance for his employees, he cannot also 
offer a wage equal to the worker’s marginal product and cover his costs. A zero profit 
pay schedule would require wage rates that vary with hours and might also impose 
minimum hours to avoid wages below the legal minimum.  What is crucial is that in the 
economically feasible set of jobs, earnings are not proportional to hours worked.    
To illustrate more concretely, suppose firms compete for workers in a competitive 
labor market by offering “jobs” which can be characterized as a vector of hourly wage 
rates (w), weekly hours ( ), and weekly fringe benefits (F).  Fringe benefits, measured in 
dollars, are independent of the number of hours a worker works. A worker’s 
consumption, C, is his earnings
ˆ h
wh ⋅ .  To motivate why firms are buying the fringes 
rather than workers, one can invoke tax considerations or adverse selection in the 
insurance market.  For our purposes, we can simply stipulate that only firms can buy 
fringe benefits. Each hour of the worker’s labor is assumed to be worth v to each firm. 
A firm that offers job j,  and successfully employs a worker at that job, 
will earn profits,
ˆ (,,) jjj whF
j π , where 
  ˆ
jj j j vh F w h π ˆ
j = ⋅−−⋅ (1) 
The profit a firm earns from hiring a worker is just the difference between the worker’s 
value of output, v,  and the wage and fringe cost of employing him. 
  Workers evaluate jobs according to their preferences for consumption, leisure 
(non-work time) and the fringe benefit.  Worker preferences can differ. Equilibrium in   9
the labor market is characterized by an assignment of worker i to job (firm) j, a zero-
profit condition for firms, and, for workers, the existence of no superior job choice. 
  This is a pure compensating differential equilibrium. Jobs with many fringe 
benefits must have either lower wage rates or greater required hours by the firm zero-
profit condition or else the firm would lose money by employing the worker.  Because v 
is a constant, the problem is formally equivalent to workers selecting F and h to 
maximize utility, which is a function of F, h, and consumption, vh F ⋅ − .   
  In equilibrium, therefore, if workers can costlessly search among jobs, each job j 
observed must   be the solution to some worker i’s maximization problem: 
   (2) 
{}








The pattern of jobs observed in the market will, of course, depend on the pattern of 
preferences for fringe benefits and leisure among workers.
2
  To see how desired hours might differ from actual hours in such an environment, 
consider Figure 1.  The horizontal axis measures work hours and the vertical axis is dollar 
earnings (or consumption).  Fringe benefits are being held constant at value F.  Point A 
on the graph represents a particular worker’s most desired job among the set of those 
possible.  Line FA represents all the possible combinations of earnings and hours that 
give the firm zero profits for fringe benefit value, F.  The slope of line FA is v, the output 
produced by a worker in an hour. The fact that A is the ideal job for the worker, given the 
zero profit constraint, implies that there is an indifference curve in consumption leisure 
                                                 
2 U.S. tax law limits the variation across workers in a firm in the amount of  tax-exempt fringe benefits. 
This might also lead to hours constraints if workers find it difficult to find their preferred combination of 
hours, fringes and compensation.  However, this would be an example of the thin market problem which I 
analyze below.        10
space (F is being held constant at its optimal value)  tangent to FA at point A. At point A, 
the worker supplies   hours and receives   in earnings.  Therefore the worker earns an 
average wage of   per hour, which is the slope of line OA and is less than his hourly 
productivity, v.   
ˆ h
* C
* ˆ / Ch
  Even though the worker has the job that is the best for him given the possibilities 
(which are arrayed along line FA, for this value of F), when asked whether he would like 
to supply more or less labor, he imagines constraint OA at his average wage rate, rather 
than FA.  On line OA, he wants to supply   rather than , but line OA is not feasible 
because it yields negative profits for the firm.    The worker will report being constrained 
to work more than he desires, with the size of the excess of  actual hours,  , over desired 
hours,  ,  being an increasing function of the amount of fringe benefits. That  amount  
determines the size of the  “wedge” between OA and FA, a wedge with both income and 
substitution effects both of which lead to less desired labor supply.  In this case, the 
wedge is between the perceived return to an hour (the slope of OA) and the true marginal 
return, v, the slope of FA.  





  Costly search can give rise to monopsony power as firms know that both their 
existing workers and searching workers can not costlessly know all potential job offers.  
Hence firms can offer jobs that are not as attractive as the jobs offered by other 
employers and still retain existing employees and attract new ones.  Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) and Manning (2003) develop a simple, yet elegant equilibrium model 
of dynamic monopsony which can be used to motivate this section.  In their model, each   11
worker has identical non-labor reservation value of b and value of marginal product v.    
Job offers arrive at the rate λ  whether the worker is employed or not; workers leave their 
jobs for nonemployment at the exogenous rate δ .   Workers in jobs change jobs when 
they get an offer better than their current job, while nonemployed searchers accept any 
offer above their reservation wage. Burdett and Mortensen and Manning show that in this 
environment, even though firms are identical, there will be an equilibrium distribution of 
wage offers
3  with wages ranging from b to less than v, and that the expected value of the 
wage held by workers is a weighted average of b and v with the weights depending on the 
ratio / λ δ . As  / λ δ  rises, workers and unemployed searchers get more frequent offers, 
the labor market approaches pure competition and the average wage approaches its 
competitive value, v. Low values of  / λ δ  imply few offers, more monopsony power and 
average wages closer to b.  But in equilibrium all firms exercise some monopsony power 
by paying a wage less than v. 
  To see that firms with monopsony power will want to constrain worker hours, 
consider Figure 2. In this graph, a worker’s hours of work are on the horizontal axis while 
the wage rate is on the vertical.  Suppose the employer offers a wage rate of  and 
allows the worker to choose hours. The worker accepts the offer and chooses   hours. 




*, m hw  is given by the U-shaped curve uu and 
the worker’s labor supply curve passes through the minimum point of the indifference 
curve.  If the firm can offer a different job that gives it more profit and makes the worker 
as well off, it will surely want to do so.  Are there points off the worker’s supply curve 
                                                 
3 Firms offering high wages will make less profit on each worker but attract more workers, while firms 
offering low wages make more per worker but attract fewer workers. Hence all firms make the same profit 
in equilibrium.   12
that would give the worker as much utility as uu and the firm more profit?  The firm’s 
isoprofit line through ( must be upward sloping since at that point each hour of 
labor used by the firm creates profit of 
)
*, m hw
m vw − ; hence another hour at the same wage 
gives the firm more profit.  As long aswv < , isoprofit lines are upward sloping and the 
firm can offer a job like point A, which the worker will accept (since he accepted the job 
which gives the same utility
* (, ) m hw
4) and make more profit. Hence a firm with 
monopsony power will want to offer jobs which constrain workers to supply more labor 
than they would like at the wage offered.  At point A, the firm requires hours of   but the 
worker would rather work   hours at that wage, so the worker is working   more 
hours than he would like.  Again, the “wedge” arises from the difference between the 
actual constraint facing the worker (the isoprofit line through point A) and the perceived 
constraint (a horizontal line through A) 
ˆ h
** h
** ˆ hh −
  Labor unions are another source of market power acting to constrain the hours its 
members work.  The argument is similar to the monopsony argument. A union raises the 
welfare of its members by exercising its monopoly power and limiting the supply of labor 
to the firm. Positive union rents imply that the union wage exceeds the reservation wage 
of the members, so each worker would prefer to work more than is in the interests of the 
other members. The union must constrain hours to maximize the rents of its members. 
  With market power,  unconstrained jobs are not infeasible, as they are in the fixed 
cost  fringe benefit case,  but they are not in the interests of the agent with the market 
power and hence will not be chosen.  An employer with  monopsony power, for example, 
                                                 
4 Bloemen (2005) shows that when workers care about both wage rates and required hours, their optimal 
search strategy is to set a reservation utility level and accept any job which meets it.     13
could offer an unconstrained job at any wage less than or equal to v and cover his costs.  
However, if the employer exploits his monopsony power at all and pays a wage less than 
v, only constrained jobs are efficient.   
 
Implicit Contracts 
  Firms may provide risk averse workers with long-term employment contracts that 
insure against fluctuations in marginal product.
5  As Rosen’s (1985) survey shows, these 
contracts specify worker consumption and labor supply for any realized value of a 
random productivity shock.  Though the contracts are efficient in the long run, at any 
moment a worker may find himself working either more or less than they would desire 
given the wage, defined as current earnings per hour, he is currently paid.  The implicit 
contract breaks the connection between the wage and hours.  When marginal product is 
high, the contract will require longer hours than the worker would choose at the average 
hourly wage he is currently paid.  The reverse is true when marginal product is low.  
Hence, implicit contracts would be an equilibrium explanation for the finding that 
workers are more likely to want to work less the greater their current hours.  Under 
implicit contracts, hours constraints are also illusory because workers in the long run 
value the risk spreading that contracts provide. 
  Similarly, agency models of lifetime wages argue that, in order to deter shirking, 
employers pay less than the worker’s value to the firm at the beginning of his career and 
more at the end (Kahn and Lang (1991)).  Employers will then need to constraint workers 
to work more than they would choose at the beginning of their careers and less than they 
                                                 
5 Ham and Reilly (2002) find evidence consistent with implicit contracts.   14
would choose at the end of their careers. Like the risk-sharing contract, these long-term 
arrangements are efficient in the long run but require hours constraints in the short run. 
Overtime Premia 
Legally mandated overtime premia can also give rise to hours constraints.  Again, 
suppose worker value to the firm is a constant v per hour so that the competitive wage, 
before the imposition of overtime premia, equals v.  Firms have no interest in 
constraining hours.  When overtime premia are imposed on weekly hours above 40, a 
naïve approach assumes that the straight-time wage continues to equal v.  Now firms will 
constrain hours to be less than 40, to avoid paying more for hours than they are worth to 
the firm. (See Ehrenberg (1971)).   Figure 3 shows the set of feasible jobs as the line 
ODB with slope v.  In the absence of an overtime premium, a worker chooses point C and 
works more than 40 hours.  With an overtime premium and the naïve assumption that the 
straight-time wage stays at v, the constraint becomes ODE.  Firms will constrain hours to 
be no more than 40, which clearly constrains any worker who would choose more than 40 
hours at wage v. 
Trejo (1991) pointed out that assuming that the straight-time wage remains 
constant with an overtime premium is naïve; the firm could still offer the job initially 
chosen by the worker at point C by a suitable adjustment of the straight-time wage rate. 
OFG represents a straight-time wage and overtime premium that allows the firm to offer 
job C, which the worker clearly prefers to the naïve constrained job, D.  But at C, the 
worker may still feel constrained; he would like to work more hours at the overtime rate 
along CG.  The firm won’t offer a job on CG because any job above ODB is not 
economically feasible.  Again, the hours constraint is caused by a wedge between the jobs   15
that are feasible (ODB) and the worker’s perceived constraint (OFG).    Under either the 
naïve model or Trejo’s model, workers covered by mandatory overtime premia should be 
more likely to report wanting to work more. 
 
Empirical Implications of Wedge Theories  
  The explanations for hours constraints described above share the implication that 
workers’ sense that their hours are constrained arises from the difference or wedge 
between a hypothetical menu of jobs with a range of  hours at the current average wage 
and the true menu of economically feasible jobs.  For example, in the fixed cost/fringe 
benefit model, the worker imagines (or is asked to imagine) being able to work less at the 
same wage rate, but in fact if he worked less it would only be economically feasible to 
pay him a lower wage rate because the fixed cost of fringe benefits must be covered.  
Likewise, the union member imagines being able to work more at the same union wage 
rate, but if all union members worked more, the high union wage could not be sustained.  
In the implicit contracts model, workers want to work more in slack times because the 
wage has not fallen to clear the market.  And in the overtime model, the worker imagines 
being able to work more along the legally mandated menu of hours and compensation, 
earning incremental compensation that exceeds his incremental value to the firm. 
  A common feature of all these wedge models is that the constrained worker will 
not be able to find another job that offers his preferred hours at the wage he expects 
because that job is economically infeasible.  Such constrained workers will not be 
observed changing their hours of work to ease the perceived constraint.  In contrast, the 
search model described below does predict that constrained workers will change their   16
hours as they continue to search for and move to jobs which better fit their preferences.  
One empirically testable implication is that those workers with jobs that create a wedge 
who say they would like to work less will not be observed reducing their hours of work in 
the future.      
A second testable implication of the wedge explanation is that, comparing two 
workers with the same actual hours, the worker with a job involving a  wedge will be 
more likely to report wanting to work less.  This comparison is illustrated in Figure 1 by  
comparing the worker with a job with fringe benefits whose preferences are illustrated in 
the figure to a worker with different preferences who chooses   hours along line OA, a 
job without fringe benefits. Both workers are observed at the same hours but the worker 
with fringe benefits wants to work less while the worker without fringe benefits is 




B. Mismatch Theories 
Search Costs 
  Turning now to models of labor market mismatch, consider a simple search 
model. For costly search to explain hours constraints, firms must be offering jobs, tied 
hours and compensation rather than free choice of hours at a fixed wage rate. 
Consequently there must be some reason, such as one of those already examined, for 
firms to be concerned about hours.    
To fix ideas, suppose a labor market consists of the same number of workers and 
firms.  Each firm offers one job and will employ at most one worker.  Each worker’s 
hourly contribution to the firm’s revenue is v; worker productivity is identical across   17
workers and across firms.  Firms compete for workers in a competitive labor market by 
offering “jobs” which can be characterized as a vector of hourly wage rates (w) and 
required weekly hours ( ).  Workers differ only in their preferences over hours of work.  
Let  (v) denote the desired hours of worker i when paid a wage rate equal to .  
Although search costs give employers some monopsony power, to focus solely on search 
cost, assume that employers do not exploit it.  Instead they offer jobs with wages equal to 




  Suppose the distribution of   across workers is identical to the distribution of 
required hours,  across jobs. Here “required” means both a minimum number of hours 




6   With perfect information, each worker would find 
her ideal job, the one that requires her desired hours.  With costly search, however, there 
will be mismatches.  When worker i is matched to job j, the extent of the mismatch is 
given by the absolute value of the deviation between desired and required hours. 
* ˆ
ji hh − .  
In a simple search model, in which a worker pays a fixed cost, c, to draw randomly from 
the distribution of jobs, the expected value of mismatch will be an nondecreasing 
function of c. Letting  ( )
* ˆ ; H hhc −  denote the cumulative distribution of mismatch, it is 
clear that H is a non-increasing function of c; that is, higher search cost can not make the 
distribution of mismatch better.  Hence the probability that a randomly chosen individual 
worker experiences mismatch of at least a certain amount will be a non-decreasing 
function of search cost, c, a result which will be useful in the empirical work.    
 
                                                 
6 The reason for required hours is unspecified; the focus here is search.   18
Economies of Synchronization and Thin Markets 
  The last explanation of hours constraints rests on the assumption that a firm is 
more productive if all workers have the same hours (see Weiss (1996)).  Firms can either 
offer jobs at lower wages and let each of its workers choose his hours or take advantage 
of economies of coordination and require uniform hours across all workers but offer 
higher wage jobs.   Suppose at least some firms find it worthwhile to offer the high wage 
– constrained hours jobs.
7  The distribution of required hours will be “lumpier” than the 
distribution of worker preferences if there are more workers than firms and there are no 
mass points in the distribution of worker preferences.  Workers will be confronted with a 
choice of a lower wage job with free choice of  hours or a higher wage job that requires 
them to work either more or less than would like at that wage.  Figure 4 illustrates. Hours 
of work are on the horizontal axis and the wage rate is on the vertical.  Suppose every 
worker’s marginal product at firms not taking advantage of economies of scale is v. At a 
wage of v the worker would choose hours h′ and attain the utility given by indifference 
curve uu. In this worker’s labor market, three firms enforce uniformity of hours, reaping 
the benefit of economies of scale and offering higher wages.  Their job offers are points 
A, B, and C. A worker with the preferences illustrated in Figure 4 will choose job B with 
required hours . At the wage of job B, however, this worker would like to work   
hours so the divergence between actual and desired hours is the distance . Note that 
this divergence can be in either direction depending on the distribution of the high wage-





                                                 
7 In other words, there are enough workers who value higher wages enough relative to the hours constraint 
that the firm can recruit a workforce.  As Weiss (1996) shows, what is crucial is the productivity benefit of 
synchronization compared to the variation in preferences for leisure across workers.    19
  The probability that the absolute value of the divergence, ˆ hh
∗ − , exceeds some 
reporting threshold will depend on the thinness of the labor market, which should be 
inversely related to its absolute size.
8  In a big labor market, there is more likely to be a 
high wage job with required hours close to a randomly drawn workers preferred hours of 
work, just as there is more likely to be a radio station playing exactly the type of music 
one likes. So market size should reduce the likelihood of an hours divergence of a given 
size. 
  The distribution of the high-wage, inflexible-hours jobs will reflect the 
preferences of the workers in the labor market because firms will have an incentive to 
fashion jobs to fit those preferences. A worker whose preferences differ from most other 
workers will be more likely to take a job with a large divergence between required and 
desired hours. In an analogous situation in local product markets, George and Waldfogel 
(2003) show that the racial composition of the customer base in local newspaper markets 
affects the likelihood that consumers of a particular race purchase a newspaper.  In other 
words, if there are many other consumers with similar tastes, firms will produce products 
closer to one’s liking.  Bringing the analogy back to the labor market, we expect that the 
mismatch between desired and actual hours of work should be lower for workers whose 
preferences are similar to the preferences of a majority of the workforce.     
 
 
                                                 
8 Although this seems an intuitive proposition that follows directly from models of horizontal 
differentiation in product space (such as Dixit and Stiglitz(1977)), empirical studies of market size effects 
in product markets have focused instead on issues such as the effect on competition (Campbell and 
Hopenheyn(2002)) or vertical product quality (Berry and Waldfogel(2003)). This probably reflects the 
difficulty of obtaining credible data on consumer “satisfaction” with horizontal product attributes. If so, 
data on constrained hours present a unique opportunity to test these thick market models.   20
Summary of Theoretical Effects 
  The six theoretical scenarios have different implications for the divergence 
between desired and actual hours. They imply that differences across individuals in 
reporting hours constraints should be related to the characteristics of the labor market the 
individual participates in, the job the individual has, and possibly individual 
characteristics themselves as taste shifters.  Individuals in “thin” labor markets or markets 
with high search costs should be more likely to be mismatched and report hours 
constraints in either direction.  Monopsony is another market-level characteristic that 
could affect constraints, though the appropriate market may not be geographically 
defined.  Certain job characteristics should also affect hours constraints. Mismatch 
implies that those in jobs with longer hours will be more likely to report working too 
much.  Under implicit contracts, actual hours are also related to constraints, even in an 
equilibrium framework.  Fringe benefits should increase the likelihood of a worker being 
constrained to work more than he wants, even holding actual hours constant, but reduce 
the likelihood of being constrained to work less than he wants.   Overtime premia and 
monopoly union wages should have the opposite effect: workers will be more likely to 
want to work more and less likely to want to work less.  Note that, strictly speaking, the 
fringe benefit argument in isolation would not be consistent with anyone wanting to work 
more hours.  However combine fringe benefits with mismatch from search and there will 
be workers who want to work more even though they have fringe benefits. More 
generally, with multiple reasons for hours constraints plus unobserved taste variation 
across workers, fringe benefits will reduce the likelihood of workers wanting to work 
more.   21
III. Empirical Tests 
 
A. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  To test the various explanations of hours constraints requires data on hours 
constraints.  Fortunately, the May, 2001 Current Population Survey asked working 
respondents whether they would prefer to work more or less than they currently work at 
the same wage.  The answers to that question form the basis for the empirical work here.  
Since all the empirical work depends on this self-reported constraint variable, it is worth 
making sure that survey responses are consistent with worker behavior. Table 1 confirms 
that those workers who said they wanted to work less were, in fact, observed, on average, 
subsequently  reducing their hours, while those workers who said they wanted to work 
more were later observed increasing their hours on average.  
To explore the empirical implications of the six theoretical scenarios we need 
measures of fringe benefits, monopsony and union power, overtime premia, search cost 
and market thinness.  The CPS asks workers  whether the employer contributes to 
employee health insurance and whether the worker is covered by a pension plan on his 
job.  The CPS then makes an imputation of the amount of the employer contribution to 
health insurance based on other information like the worker’s industry.  Since fringe 
benefit information is gathered only in the March CPS survey, to combine it with the 
hours constraint data from May requires merging and matching the participants in the 
March and May, 2001 surveys.   Union constraints can be captured by whether the 
worker is a union member or, if not, in a job covered by union contract.  Overtime premia   22
are proxied by whether the worker is paid on an hourly basis since he is much more likely 
to be covered by mandatory overtime premia if he is paid hourly.
9
The 2001 matched CPS sample is described in Table 2. All employed workers are 
included whether they are paid hourly or not.  About a quarter of all workers say they 
would like to work more at the same wage while about 7% say they would like to work 
less, for an overall dissatisfaction rate of about a third. Males are more likely to want to 
work more than females are; females are more likely to want to work less.  Whites are 
more likely to want to work less than non-whites, as are those with high levels of 
schooling and those who are not paid hourly.  
It is trickier to measure the monopsony power faced by a worker.  Manning 
(2003, p. 44) argues that an empirical measure of monopsony power is the fraction of 
those starting jobs who came to that job from nonemployment rather than from another 
job.  His reasoning is as follows. The Burdett-Mortensen-Manning dynamic monopsony 
model sketched above shows that low values of  / λ δ , the ratio of the job finding rate to 
the job destruction rate, imply more monopsony power and also imply that workers do 
not move much from firm to firm because the rate of received offers is low.  On the other 
hand, the greater is  / λ δ , the more frequently workers get offers from other firms, the 
more they move to other firms and the more employers have to worry about competition 
from other employers and keep wages high. Hence the fraction of new workers who have 
been recruited from nonemployment rather than from other jobs, which is high when 
/ λ δ  is low, is an empirical measure of monopsony power. Manning estimates this 
measure of monopsony power, the fraction starting jobs who do not come from other 
                                                 
9 Workers who are “exempt” from the overtime provisions of federal labor law (FLSA) must be salaried 
and must perform certain types of duties.  It is difficult to determine exactly who is exempt in the CPS, but 
it is known that hourly employees cannot be exempt.   23
jobs, by worker characteristics from CPS data. His parameter estimates can be used to 
construct a predicted monopsony measure for each worker. The implication is that 
employers treat different types of workers differently depending on the labor market 
conditions for that type of worker.  For example, Manning finds that women are more 
likely to enter a job from nonemployment, so they are subject to more monopsony 
power.
10  
.  To measure search cost and market thinness, labor markets need to be defined. I 
define geographical labor markets two ways: counties or MSAs.  Part of the cost of 
search is traveling to employers to investigate jobs.  Assuming that travel cost is related 
to distance, search cost should be a function of the density of employers.  The density of 
establishments in a location approximates the density of employers. Search cost is also 
affected by the opportunity cost of search time which will be a function of the state 
unemployment insurance replacement rate. 
Market thinness should be inversely related to the absolute size of the labor 
market which can be measured alternatively by the size of the labor force or the number 
of establishments in the labor market.  Another aspect of market thinness is the number of 
workers in the labor market with similar preferences. Since men and women have 
different preferences over hours, women in a market with few other women face a thin 
market for jobs that fit their preferences and should be more likely to be constrained. 
Hence the market thinness argument implies that a greater share of women in the labor 
market reduces the mismatch of actual and desired hours for women. 
                                                 
10 The Mortensen-Burdett-Manning model imposes the severe assumption that the job offer rate is 
independent of whether the worker is employed.  Hence, a worker currently not employed will accept any 
job deemed superior to nonemployment, while, of course, an employed worker will only accept a job which 
dominates his current one.     24
 
B. Effects of Job and Worker Characteristics on Hours Constraints 
 In this section, I report probit estimates of the effect of job and worker 
characteristics such as fringe benefits, union status, and hourly pay, on self-reported 
hours constraints.  To motivate the randomness in the empirical model, suppose that a 
worker reports wanting to work less if the difference between actual hours and desired 
hours ( ) exceeds some individual-specific reporting threshold value, ˆ hh
∗ − ε ; if the 
discrepancy is less than ε  it is too small to report.  The values of ε  in the sample are 
assumed to be drawn from a normal probability distribution function () F ε . The 
probability that a randomly chosen member of the sample reports working too much is 
then . Hence with our proxies for the theoretical 
determinants of the divergence between actual and desired hours, we can test the 
implications of the alternative hypotheses with a standard probit model. 
() ( ˆ Pr 1 hh F hh ε
∗ −>= − −) ˆ ∗
  To be specific, both of the fringe benefits measures and the monopsony power 
measure should be positively related to the probability that a worker wants to work less 
and negatively related to the probability that a worker reports wanting to work more. 
Both union membership and being paid hourly (and hence less likely to be exempt from 
overtime premiums)  should raise the probability of wanting to work more and reduce the 
probability of wanting to work less. Both of the mismatch models predict that a worker’s 
actual hours should raise the chance that the worker wants to work less because job 
assignments will not be perfectly aligned with preferences.  The implicit contract model  
implies the same because wages do not equal current marginal product.   25
  These job characteristics are not assumed to be exogenous, but are chosen by 
workers, a fact the fringe benefit model and Figure 1 explicitly take into account.  Non-
random selection into jobs with fringe benefits, union coverage or an overtime premium 
means that the empirical estimates cannot represent the effect on hours constraints of 
giving fringe benefits to a worker currently without them.  Instead, the estimates compare 
workers who have chosen jobs identical in all respects except for the job characteristic.  
As the previous discussion of the fringe benefit model and Figure 1 made clear, even 
though all workers have selected themselves into their most preferred feasible job, 
workers who have chosen jobs with fringe benefits will be more likely to report hours 
constraints.     
  Table 3A report probits on wanting to work less.  As theory predicts, health 
insurance is positively associated with wanting to work less, the pension effect is positive 
but insignificant.  Monopsony is predicted to increase wanting to work less; instead it 
reduces it. Union coverage has no significant effect, while being paid hourly is strongly 
negatively associated with wanting to work less, as theory predicts.  
Table 3B adds the worker’s actual hours as an explanatory variable as a stronger 
test of the model.  An alternative view of the connection between job characteristics like 
fringe benefits and hours constraints might be that  employers will require jobs with 
fringe benefits to have longer hours leading more workers at those jobs to want to work 
less. That view would predict that holding actual hours constant, fringes would have no 
effect on hours constraints.  Instead, the model here argues that of two workers with the 
same hours, the one with fringes will be more likely to want to work less.  Of course, 
since actual hours will be correlated with other job characteristics that lead to constraints   26
(such as fringe benefits) including actual hours as a variable should attenuate the effect of 
the other explanatory variables. A comparison of Tables 3A and 3B reveals that adding 
actual work hours does mute the effect of the other variables but that health insurance and 
being paid hourly are still strongly associated with wanting to work less. The estimated 
effects are not only statistically significant, they are of considerable magnitude.  The 
estimates in column (5) of Table 3B imply that $2500 of health insurance raises the 
probability that a worker will report wanting to work less by one percentage point (recall 
that only 7% of workers say they want to work less).  Finally, Table 3C adds industry and 
occupation dummies to the estimates.  Since industry and occupation are correlated with 
some of the other explanatory variables , we expect and observe further muting of effects, 
but the fringe benefits, hourly pay, and actual hours variables are still significant.  
Tables 4A through 4C report similar probits on wanting to work more.  Here, both 
types of fringe benefits, pension coverage and health insurance, have significantly 
negative effects as theory predicts but monopsony power has a positive effect which is 
exactly counter to theory.  Union coverage is significant in the predicted direction in 
column(5) of Tables 4A and 4B, but adding the industry and occupation dummies in 
Table 4C knocks that union effect down, as would be predicted since union status is very 
correlated with industry and occupation. Being paid hourly is strongly associated with 
wanting to work more.  Pensions as well as health insurance are strongly related to hours 
constraints.  A worker with pension coverage is roughly 4% less likely to report wanting 
to work more. 
In order to use all the information available, Tables 5A through 5C describe 
ordered probits on the three possible responses: wanting to work less, wanting to work   27
the same, and wanting to work more. The results are similar to the previous probit 
estimates. Both types of fringe benefits are again strongly related to hours constraints in 
the expected direction.  Union members want to work more, though the effect is obscured 
when industry and occupation are controlled.  The monopsony results are not in the 
predicted direction. Being paid hourly, which should be a proxy for being covered by 
mandatory overtime premia, is also strongly related to hours constraints in the expected 
direction.  The results in Table 5C, as well as Tables 3C and 4C, hold constant actual 
hours as well as worker demographics, geographic region, industry and occupation. 
 
C. Testing the Implications of Illusory Constraints 
 
The wedge models argue that hours constraints are illusory in the sense that  
workers consider jobs with different hours and the same average hourly pay to be 
preferable  but cannot actually find such jobs because they are not economically viable.  
For example, in Figure 1, the worker imagines being able to choose a job with fewer 
hours along line OA, but the jobs along OA are not economically feasible.    This worker 
will report wanting to work less but will not be able to find a job preferred to point A and 
hence over time will not be observed reducing his hours.  Table 6 presents an empirical 
test of this prediction.  The dependent variable is the change in total hours of work from 
May, 2001 to the following March, 2002.  We already know from Table 1 that workers 
who report wanting to work fewer hours in May, 2001 are observed on average to be 
reducing their hours of work.  The wedge model argues that of those workers in May, 
2001 who say they want fewer hours, those with fixed cost fringe benefits will be less 
likely to reduce their hours because their constraints are illusory.      28
In Table 6, I regress the change in hours on an interaction between fringe benefits 
and the desire to work fewer hours.  I control for fringe benefits at the beginning (May, 
2001) and end of the period (March, 2002) to account for the fact that fringe benefits are 
associated with jobs that require more hours, so that even if workers are moving 
randomly between jobs they will be more likely to decrease their hours of work if they 
have a job with fringe benefits in May, 2001 and will be less likely to decrease their 
hours of work if they have a job with fringe benefits in March, 2002.  The results 
reported in Table 6 show that the data is consistent with illusory constraints.  The 
regression reported in Column (1) defines a fringe benefit as pension coverage and shows 
that those who said they wanted to work fewer hours and had no pension coverage were 
successful in reducing their weekly workhours by a highly significant average of 3.4, 
while workers who said they wanted to work less but had pension coverage did not 
appreciably change their hours. This latter group of workers felt constrained in May 2001 
but could not find a job with a better wage-hours combination.  The illusion of constraint 
was induced by the nonlinear relation between workhours and feasible average hourly 
earnings.  This strong prediction of the illusion model is robust to alternative definitions 
of fringes (see columns (2) and (3) of Table 6) and to alternative specifications such as 
probits on whether hours decreased from May, 2001 to March, 2002. 
 
D. Effects of Labor Market Characteristics on Hours Constraints 
 
  Tables 7 and 8 report probits using the search cost and market thinness variables 
under two alternative geographic labor market definitions, MSA (Table 7) and county 
(Table 8). The dependent variable is “dissatisfaction” -- whether the worker wants to 
work different hours, either more or fewer, than he or she now works. Density and the UI   29
replacement rate are hypothesized to reduce search cost and thereby dissatisfaction. 
Although density is insignificant, the other proxy for search cost, the state UI 
replacement rate, is usually significant and always in the expected direction.  The impact 
of UI replacement rates is substantial; a ten-percentage point rise in the UI replacement 
rate reduces the probability of being dissatisfied with work hours by .031, or about 10 
percent of its mean value. In contrast, the market thickness proxies, the number of 
establishments or the size of the labor force, do not work consistently as predicted; in the 
county estimates of Table 8 there is little effect of the labor force size, while in the MSA 
estimates in Table 7 labor force and number of establishments are significant but in the 
opposite direction.    Columns (2), (4) and (5) of Tables 7 and 8 also include whether the 
worker is paid hourly on the possibility that hourly workers are more likely to imagine 
working different hours and hence be more dissatisfied with current hours.     
Finally, Table 9 examines the hypothesis that female workers are more satisfied 
with their hours in counties with a higher share of female workers. No support for this 
hypothesis is found in the data. 
  
IV. Conclusion 
  Although many jobs do not allow workers to vary hours, neoclassical theory 
argues that workers can choose jobs with combinations of hours and compensation that 
suit them.  However, some workers report wanting to work more or less than they 
currently work at the same rate of pay.  This paper examined two broad classes of 
explanations of these self-reported hours constraints – mismatch and wedge theories.  
Under mismatch, a preferred job is economically feasible but cannot be costlessly   30
attained either because of search costs or moving costs, in the case of market thinness. 
Wedge theories stress the divergence between a menu of wage-hours choices at the 
worker’s current average hourly wage and the options that are economically feasible.   
For example, fatigue effects or set-up costs, including fixed cost fringe benefits, imply 
that feasible average hourly earnings must vary with total hours.  Both monopsony and 
union monopoly power generate similar non-proportionalities that cause wedges, as do 
overtime premia. 
Theory suggests that whether a worker reports working more or less than he 
wants will depend on the labor market the worker participates in (search cost, market 
thinness, monopsony), the job the worker currently has (fixed cost fringe benefits, union 
status, current hours, mandatory overtime premium) and possibly individual taste shifters 
such as age or gender.  Using data on self-reported hours constraints, I first show that 
workers who want to work less are in fact observed reducing their hours while those who 
say they want to work more increase their hours.  Having a job with fixed cost fringe 
benefits is strongly associated, as theory predicts, with wanting to work less. Being 
covered by a union contract or being paid hourly (strongly related to mandatory overtime 
coverage) are both associated with wanting to work more, as theory predicts.  I find no 
evidence of the predicted relation between monopsony and hours constraints, but that 
may be the fault of the measure of monopsony power. 
Actual hours raise the probability of wanting to work less, a result that is 
consistent with equilibrium theories of mismatch and implicit contracts as well as 
disequilibrium models.   Dissatisfaction with hours should be greater in thin markets, yet 
the data do not show it.  Finally, the two proxies for search costs had mixed results.  State   31
UI replacement rates reduce hours dissatisfaction as predicted, yet density does not 
reduce mismatch which is counter to theory if, as seems reasonable, search costs are 
inversely related to the density of employers. 
  The wedge theories, such as the fixed cost fringe benefit variant, imply that hours 
constraints depend on job characteristics, even holding actual hours constant.  That is, 
although employers may require longer hours on jobs with fringe benefits, workers in 
jobs with fringes are more likely to be constrained than workers working the same hours 
in jobs without fringes. Moreover, the constraints are illusory in the sense that a job with 
a more preferred combination of hours and compensation is not economically feasible.  If 
such a job were feasible, we would expect to observe workers who receive fixed cost 
fringe benefits and report being constrained to work too much move over time to reduce 
their hours.  However, if the more preferred jobs are an illusion, we would not expect 
them to reduce their hours over time.  The empirical results show that while workers 
without fixed cost fringe benefits who say they would like to work less do in fact manage 
to decrease their hours over time, there is no change in hours for workers with such 
fringes benefits who want to work less. The evidence strongly suggests the illusion of 
constraint for this latter group of workers.     
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Figure 1: Fringe Benefits and Hours Constraints 
 
 













































Figure 2: Monopsony 
 











Figure 3:  Overtime Premium 
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Source:  Matched observations from the CPS in May 2001 and in March 2002 who were 
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Table 3A:  Probit Estimates of Hours Constraints: Worker Wants to Work Less 
Not Controllin d Occupation 


























oyer Contribution to 



































15379  15379  27 7827 
 
tions from Ma 001 and May, 20 rent Population s. 
.   In square s are effects   unit change in vari  on 
of wanting fewer hours, evaluated at the means. Each regression includes age, a dummy for 




























Number  of  Observations  7827 78
 
 
Note:  Matched observa









white, a gender dummy, three educ
** = 5% significance, * = 10% sig
ies, eight n dum ignific  41
 
Table   Less 
Controlling for Current Hours bu not for Industry and Occupation 
 hours 

























Worker has pension 
coverage on job 
   




















Worker is Paid Hourly 
 
 








Note:  Matched observations from March, 2001 and May, 2001 Current Population Surveys. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   In square brackets are effects of one unit change in variable on 
probability of wanting fewer hours, evaluated at the means. Each regression includes age, a dummy for 
white, a gender dummy, three education dummies, and eight Census region dummies.  *** = 1% 
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Table 3C:  Probit Estimates of Hours Constraints: Worker Wants to Work Less 
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Note:  Matched observations from March, 2001 and May, 2001 Current Population Surveys. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   In square brackets are effects of one unit change in variable on 
probability of wanting fewer hours, evaluated at the means. Each regression includes age, a dummy for 
white, a gender dummy, three education dummies, eight Census region dummies, twelve Census 
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Table 4A:  Probit Estimates of Hours Constraints: Worker Wants to Work More 
Not Controlling for Current Hou  or for Industry and Occupation 
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Table 4B:  Probit Estimates of Hours C raints: Worker Wants to Work More 
Controlling for Current Hours bu not for Industry and Occupation 
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Note:  Matched observations from March, 2001 and May, 2001 Current Population Surveys. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   In square brackets are effects of one unit change in variable on 
probability of wanting fewer hours, evaluated at the means. Each regression includes age, a dummy for 
white, a gender dummy, three education dummies, and eight Census region dummies.  *** = 1% 
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Table 4C:  Probit Estimates of Hours Constraints: Worker Wants to Work More 
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Note:  Matched observations from March, 2001 and May, 2001 Current Population Surveys. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   In square brackets are effects of one unit change in variable on 
probability of wanting fewer hours, evaluated at the means. Each regression includes age, a dummy for 
white, a gender dummy, three education dummies, eight Census region dummies, twelve Census 
occupation dummies and twenty-one Census industry dummies.     ***= 1% significance, ** = 5% 
gnificance, * = 10% significance. 
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Table 5A:  Ordered Probit Estimates of Hours Constraints 
Not Controlling for Current Hou  or for Industry and Occupation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 








coverage on job 
   
  
-.121*** 
(.022)  _____ _____ _____ 134***
(.032) 
 
Employer Contribution to 
nce  _____ _____ _____ 
1.06***  _____ _____ 
ob  _____    .041  _____ 
orker is Paid Hourly  _____ _____ _ .273*** 
(.030) 
.243*** 
umber  of  Observations  15379  15379  7827 7827 7827 
 
 
Note:  Matched observations from March, 2001 and May, 2001 Current Population Surveys. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   Dependent variable is 1 if worker wants to work less, 2 if worker 
wants less, 3 if  wants  more.  gressio des age
dummy for white, a gender dummy, three education dummies, eight Census region dummies *** = 1% 































____  (.031) 
N
 
 to work neither more nor   worker  to work Each re n inclu , a 
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Table 5B: Ordered Probit Es mates of Hours Constraints: 
Controlling for Current Hours bu not for Industry and Occupation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

















urrent weekly w C
  
.005*** .007*** 008*** .007*** .005***
 
 
Worker has pension 
verage co
  
 on job 
-  






(.005)  _____ _____  -  
(.008) 
anning measure)  _____  (.244)  _____ (.347) 
nion Coverage at Job  _____ _____  .048 
(.037)  _____  (.039) 
 
Worker is Paid Hourly 
 
 





Note:  Matched observations from March, 2001 and May, 2001 Current Population Surveys. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variable is 1 if worker wants to work less, 2 if worker 
wants to work neither more nor less, 3 if worker wants to work more.  Each regression includes age, a 
dummy for white, a gender dummy, three education dummies, and eight Census region dummies.  *** = 


























Number  of  Observations  15379  15379  7827 7827 7827 
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Table 5C: Ordered Probit Estimates of Hours Constraints:  




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 














Worker has pension 
coverage on job 
   
  
-.091*** 
(.023)  _____ _____ _____  -.113*** 
(.033) 
 
Employer Contribution to 












_____  .286 




Union Coverage at Job 
 
 
_____ _____  .003 




Worker is Paid Hourly 
 
 








Note:  Matched observations from March, 2001 and May, 2001 Current Population Surveys. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    Dependent variable is 1 if worker wants to work less, 2 if worker
wants to work neither more nor less, 3 if worker wants to work more.    Each regression includes age, a
dummy for white, a gender dummy, three education dummies, eight Census region dummies, twelve 
Census occupation dummies and twenty-one Census industry d
 
 
ummies.   *** = 1% significance  ** = 5% 
gnificance, * = 10% significance. 
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Table 6:  Testing the sion Hypothesis 
Depend h 2002 












































Fringe in May ’01 × Wants 








No Fringe in May ’01 × 













Number  of  Observations  9292 9292 9292 




















. Robust standard errors in parentheses.   Each regression includes male dummy, age, and age 
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Table 7: Mismatch Results for MSA Labor Markets 
  Dependent Variable: Worker wants either to work more hours 
or fewer hour






Worker Paid Hourly 
 





(.055)  _____  .218**
(.056













(.502)  )    _  -1.41*** 
(.054) 






















Notes:  Probit estimates with robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the state 
level. *** = 1  si ce, * significance. Data is from 
March 2001 and May 2001 Current Population Survey, Census of Business, 2000 Census 
and Labor Department Employment and Training Administration. Each estimate includes 
race and gend e educa ummies, eight reg mmies, twelve 



















 % significance, ** = 5% gnifican  = 10% 
er dummies, age, thre tion d ion du
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Table 8: Mismatch Results for County Labor Markets 
 
  Dep nt Variab orker w  either to rk more hours 
 
 
ende le: W ants  wo
or fewer hours  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Worker Paid Hourly  _____  .1
(.055)  _____  .
(.065)  (.065) 
55***  157**  .157** 





(. _____ _____ 
Search es: 






Labor Force Density 
 
______ _____  -2.04 
(6.50)  (13.6)  (13.7) 
 
 
Notes:  Probit estimates with robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the state 













Cost  Variabl      
 
State UI Replacement 
 
  8.36  7.06 
 
March, 2001 and May 2001 Current Population Survey, Census of Business, 2000 
Census and Labor Department Employment and Training Administration. Each estimate 
includes race and gender dummies, age, three education dummies, eight region dummies, 
twelve occupation dummies and twenty-one industry dummies. 
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Table 9:  Hours Mismatch among Female Workers and the Female Share of Employment 
 
 





Dependent  Variable:  Dissatisfaction with Hours 
  MSA Labor Markets  County Labor Markets 
r 











Notes:  Sample includes females only. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
es of  o wo  or wa
to work less than current hours. Each esti lude umm
education dummies, eight region dummies, twelve occupation dumm
industry dummies  
 




rk more nting 
 a race  y, age, three 
ies and twenty-one 
 